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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Thomas Moffat asserts that the district court erred in allowing the State to pursue 
a second prosecution for attempted strangulation as the underlying acts only constituted 
a single course of conduct, for which he had already been convicted of domestic 
battery. That second prosecution violated his state and federal constitutional rights to 
be free from double jeopardy. The State contended, after breaking down the composite 
acts underlying the charged offenses, that double jeopardy did not prohibit the dual 
prosecutions in this case. That perspective has been rejected by the United States 
Supreme Court. The proper focus of double jeopardy analysis is on the offenses 
charged. 
In this case, Mr. Moffat's actions constituted but one, continuous course of 
conduct. There are two offenses alleged from that single course of conduct. Under the 
first alternative test of double jeopardy violations, the pleading test, that is impermissible 
under the Idaho Constitution. Additionally, the two statutes which were invoked to 
define those offenses are not bilaterally unique, particularly in this case where the state 
and the district court admit the overlap based on these facts. Therefore, under the 
second alternative test of double jeopardy violations, the statutory test, the dual 
prosecutions are impermissible under both the state and federal constitutions. 
Therefore, because the second prosecution for attempted strangulation violated 
Mr. Moffat's state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy, this 
Court should reverse the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss and vacate 
Mr. Moffat's conviction for attempted strangulation. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Moffat's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court improperly denied Mr. Moffat's motion to dismiss because the 
second prosecution violated his state and federal constitutional rights to be free from 
double jeopardy. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Improperly Denied Mr. Moffat's Motion To Dismiss Because The 
Second Prosecution Violated His State And Federal Constitutional Rights To Be Free 
From Double Jeopardy 
A. Introduction 
In Idaho, there are multiple tests regarding the state and federal constitutional 
protections against double jeopardy, and failing to satisfy anyone of them results in 
a violation of those constitutional protections. 1 See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 101 
Idaho 430, 435 n.5 (1980); State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527, 530-31 (2011); 
State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 374 (Ct. App. 2011). In this case, the dual 
prosecutions of Mr. Moffat for the same course of conduct violate those constitutional 
protections. The State's argument to the contrary - that the composite facts of the 
alleged offenses can be broken apart so as to permit the dual prosecutions - is 
erroneous. 
The Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution provides that "[n]o person 
shall be ... subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." 
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). Article I, § 13 of the Idaho constitution 
provides at least coextensive protections to the Fifth Amendment. State v. McKeeth, 
136 Idaho 619, 624 (Ct. App. 2001); but see Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435 n.5 
(recognizing that Idaho provides broader protections in some situations via its pleadings 
1 Along with the two recognized tests (the pleading theory (see Thompson, 101 Idaho 
430) and the statutory theory (see Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)), 
the district court identified a third, hybrid (or elements) theory. (See R., p.97.) That test 
has not been officially recognized, but combines aspects of the other two tests. 
See, e.g., State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 374 (Ct. App. 2011); Sivak v. State, 112 
Idaho 197, 211 (1986). As such, it is necessarily discussed simultaneously with the 
other tests. 
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test). In this case, the prosecution for attempted strangulation is a second prosecution 
for the same course of conduct (the incident which occurred on May 9, 2010) as the 
misdemeanor domestic battery charge to which Mr. Moffat had already entered a guilty 
plea. (R., pp.34, 36, 71, 79.) As such, the prosecution for attempted strangulation was 
for the same offense as the misdemeanor domestic battery, and thus, as the second 
prosecution for that offense, the prosecution for the attempted strangulation violated 
Mr. Moffat's constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy under all of the tests. 
The State erroneously contends that it is permissible to break the offense down 
and analyze it for double jeopardy violations based solely on its composite acts: 
"[Mr.] Moffat has not shown that his conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery was 
not based on acts other than his grabbing Ms. Nelson's throat .... [Mr.] Moffat has 
failed to show that his attempted strangulation charge, to which he pled guilty, was 
predicated on the same act of his grabbing Ms. Nelson by the throat .... " (Resp. 
Br., pp.10-11.) That perspective has been rejected by the United States Supreme 
Court: 
[T]he Ohio Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that Nathaniel Brown 
could be convicted of both crimes because the charges against him 
focused on different parts of his 9-day joyride. App. 23. We hold a different 
view. The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that 
prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a 
single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units. 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) (emphasis added). As the United States 
Supreme Court has already rejected the State's arguments, this Court should also 
reject them. See id. The proper analysis is focused on the offenses charged, and 
under any of the tests available in Idaho, these two prosecutions violate Mr. Moffat's 
constitutional protections against double jeopardy. 
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B. Under Idaho's Pleading Test For Double Jeopardy Violations, The Second 
Prosecution For Attempted Strangulation Is Unconstitutional Because The 
Pleadings Allege Two Violations For The Same Course Of Conduct 
Regardless of this Court's conclusion in regard to the Blockburgertest (which will 
be discussed infra), the second prosecution of Mr. Moffat (for attempted strangulation) 
is unconstitutional under Idaho's independent pleading test. That test, recognized by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Thompson, provides independent protection from 
double jeopardy under the Idaho Constitution. Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435, n.5. The 
Thompson test looks to the pleadings themselves to determine whether the State is 
charging multiple offenses for one course of conduct. Id. at 435-36. If the second 
prosecution fails to pass muster under Thompson's pleadings test, then the prosecution 
is invalid, regardless of the result of the Blockburger analysis. Thompson, 101 Idaho at 
435 n.5; see also Flegel, 151 Idaho at 539-31. Basically, if one offense is but the 
means or method of the other, there cannot be two prosecutions. C.f. Flegel, 151 Idaho 
at 529. 
A proper review under the pleading theory requires the courts to look at the two 
charging documents. Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530. Where "[t]he acts comprising a violation 
of [one statute] as set forth and alleged in the Amended Information are the same acts 
with which [the defendant] was charged in the original complaint and original 
Information alleging a violation of [the other statute,]" that would indicate that there was 
one course of conduct, that the offenses are included within one another, and that 
separate prosecutions are unconstitutional. See id. (quoting State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 
6 
244, 249 (1990)).2 Therefore, in a situation where the two charging documents allege 
two violations arising from the same course of conduct or same acts, the pleading 
theory bars the second, independent prosecution. Id. 
In Mr. Moffat's case, the testimony of both the victim and the officer establish that 
there was but one course of conduct. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 1 , p.23, L.11 - p.25, L.9 (Officer 
Tolman testifying that the domestic battery charge was for the entire course of conduct 
which occurred on May 9, 2010); Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), 
p.2 (according to Ms. Stone, an independent witness, "it appeared to her as if the male 
subject was holding the female subject by her hair and in the area of her throat with the 
other hand"); Prelim. Tr., p.12 (Ms. Nelson, the victim, testifying that "he grabbed her by 
her hair with one hand and grabbed her around her throat with his other hand" as the 
correct version of events).) Officer Tolman's testimony is particularly telling in this case: 
Q. In interviewing [Ms. Nelson], were there any physical marks or injury 
that you observed on her? 
A. She had scrape marks on her nose. I believe she had scrape marks 
on her back, and she did have some finger-type marks on her neck that I 
could distinguish. 
Q. And when you went about completing the investigation, you issued a 
citation? 
A. I did, for Domestic Battery. 
Q. And that citation was issued for -- what type of Domestic Battery? 
A. Just simple domestic. We just call it simple Battery. The elements 
didn't amount to any type of felony domestic where there was no serious 
injury or great bodily harm. 
2 Of particular note is the fact that multiple "acts" (note the plural) may compromise the 
violation, and it is the charged violation which is scrutinized, not those composite acts. 
See Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530; O'Neill, 118 Idaho at 249. This demonstrates the 
erroneous nature of the State's contention that this Court should only review the 
composite acts. (See Resp. Br. at 8-13.) 
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(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.24, L.17 - p.25, L.g (emphasis added).) In fact, the district court found "[i]n 
particular, it was determined that the victim had scrape marks on her back, knees, and 
neck, as well as red marks on her neck. Based upon those findings, Detective Tolman 
charged the Defendant with misdemeanor domestic battery." (R., p.96 (emphasis 
added).) That finding of fact, unchallenged by the State, demonstrates that the 
domestic battery charge included the grabbing of Ms. Nelson's throat (i.e., the act of 
choking or attempted strangulation), and thus, that there was but one, continuous 
course of conduct. 
Despite the fact that the course of events was continuous, the State prosecuted 
that course of conduct as the violation of two separate statutes. The domestic battery 
offense, charged by citation, asserts that, on or about May 9, 2010, Mr. Moffat 
committed domestic battery in violation of I. C. § 18-918(3)(b) against Ms. Nelson, by 
using force against her, touching her against her will, or causing her bodily harm, 
evidenced by the marks on her knees, back, and neck. (R., pp.71-73.) The attempted 
strangulation offense, charged by information, asserts that on or about May 9, 2010, 
Mr. Moffat committed attempted strangulation in violation of I.C. § 18-923(1) against 
Ms. Neslon by unlawfully choking or attempting to strangle her.3 (R., p.36.) Thus, 
based on the charging documents, the same course of conduct was charged as 
violations of two separate statutes and prosecuted in two separate cases. (See 
3 As the State correctly points out, this can only be accomplished by using force about 
or causing injury to the victim's neck. (See Resp. Br. at p.9 n.6.) Additionally, as the 
prosecutor admitted below, the act of grabbing Ms. Nelson by the neck "could be a 
misdemeanor Domestic Battery." (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.36, Ls.6-10.) As such, the facts reveal 
that Officer Tolman included the forceful touching of Ms. Nelson's neck (evidenced by 
the red finger marks thereon) in the domestic battery, and that same act was also the 
basis for the attempted strangulation charge. 
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R., pp.36, 71-73.) 'There is no separate event upon which to base the additional 
charge." Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435 (emphasis added). Rather, Mr. Moffat's actions 
constituted a "continuous 'act'" and cannot be subjected to multiple punishments. 
See, e.g., State v. Gallatin, 106 Idaho 564, 569 (Ct. App. 1984). Such dual 
prosecutions violate the Idaho Constitution's protection against double jeopardy.4 See, 
e.g., Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530. 
Furthermore, they allege a crime which is but the means or method by which a 
second crime was committed, which also demonstrates a violation of the Idaho 
Constitution. See Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435-36. The question is not whether the 
two charges could be committed in a manner other than was charged; the question is 
whether the offenses as charged are for the same course of conduct. Thompson, 101 
Idaho at 433, 435. In this case, as charged, the dual prosecutions are for the same 
course of conduct - the incident which occurred on May 9, 2010. (See R., pp.36, 71-
73.) Therefore, the dual prosecutions violate the Idaho Constitution's protection against 
double jeopardy. See Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530. 
4 It would be no more permissible for the State to prosecute a defendant in two separate 
prosecutions for two charges of battery, one for each punch that he threw during the 
course of a brawl. See, e.g., Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530. Similarly, it is inappropriate to 
pursue two prosecutions, one for attempted robbery (accomplished through use of a 
shotgun) and another for assault with a deadly weapon (accomplished through the use 
of that same shotgun), even though the composite acts underlying those charges were 
distinct from one another. Thompson, 101 Idaho at 436 (rejecting the State's argument 
that there were actually two separate acts: the initial attempt to enter the home 
(attempted robbery) and the firing of the shotgun at the door (assault with a deadly 
weapon)). 
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C. Under The Federal Blockburger Test For Double Jeopardy Violations, The 
Second Prosecution For Attempted Strangulation Is Unconstitutional Because 
There Is No Bilateral Uniqueness Between The Statutes Under Which Mr. Moffat 
Was Charged 
The Blockburger rule is succinctly stated: "where the same act or transaction 
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision 
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.,,5 State v. Osweiler, 140 
5 As indicated by both the Blockburger and Os weiler Courts, the composite facts are not 
irrelevant to a determination regarding double jeopardy protections; they just are not the 
focus of the analysis. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301; Os weiler, 140 Idaho at 826. For 
example, when considering the implications of double jeopardy in regard to charges of 
burglary and rape, the Idaho Supreme Court considered the facts of the case, but it did 
so by focusing on the elements established in the statute, examining the statutes for 
bilateral uniqueness: 
As defined, the crime of burglary is complete when there is an entry with 
the intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony. Thus, if the 
burglar who enters with the intent to commit a specific felony abandons or 
fails to perform that felony, he will still be guilty of burglary. We find that 
neither rape nor burglary is a lesser included offense of the other. The 
burglary was complete when McCormick entered the victim's residence 
with the intent to commit rape, whereas the rape was not committed until 
there was an act of sexual intercourse under the circumstances described 
in I.C. §18-6101. 
State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114-15 (1979) (citations omitted). Similarly, the 
Legislature may decide that certain conduct should be penalized twice. See, e.g., 
State v. Bryan, 145 Idaho 612, 616 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 
359, 368 (1983). However, such a procedure is permissible only where the dual 
prosecution of the redundant charges is "combined in a single trial." Hunter, 459 U.S. at 
368; Bryan, 145 Idaho at 616. Because the prosecutions against Mr. Moffat were not 
consolidated in a single trial, this limitation to the Blockburger analysis is inapplicable in 
his case. 
Additionally, the Legislature's Statement of Purpose in regard to I.C. §18-923's 
criminalization of attempted strangulation reveals that it did not authorize cumulative 
punishment for the same act, which is another reason the Hunter exception is 
inapplicable: "This statute is intended specifically to permit the prosecution of attempted 
strangulation where no visible injury is present .... " 2005 Idaho Session Laws Ch. 303 
(S.8. 1062) (emphasis added). As such, the Legislature did not authorize cumulative 
10 
Idaho 824, 826 (2004) (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301). According to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, the constitutional protections afforded by the double jeopardy clause 
are properly focused on the elements of the offense, not the composite acts underlying 
the offense. McCormick 100 Idaho at 114; State v. Sterley, 112 Idaho 1097, 1099 
(1987); see also Brown, 432 U.S. at 169 (rejecting Ohio's assertion to the contrary). 
Nonetheless, the State has requested this Court focus its Blockburger analysis 
on the composite acts underlying Mr. Moffat's offense. (Resp. Br. at 8-13.) Under a 
proper Blockburger analysis, the second prosecution for attempted strangulation 
violated Mr. Moffat's state and federal constitutional rights to be free from double 
jeopardy. The focus of the "statutory test" is on the statutes themselves, not the 
composite actions underlying the offenses: "An offense will be deemed to be a lesser 
included offense of another, greater offense, if all the elements required to sustain a 
conviction of the lesser included offense are included within the elements of the greater 
offense.,,6 McCormick, 100 Idaho at 114 (emphasis added) (focusing its examination for 
double jeopardy issues on the elements required for conviction under I.C. § 18-1401 
and I.C. § 18-6101, not on the composite actions); see also Sterley, 112 Idaho at 1100-
punishment for the same course of conduct, but rather, gave the State a separate 
avenue to pursue a single conviction for that course of conduct when a certain factual 
scenario unfolded. Therefore, the Hunter limitation does not apply to these statutes and 
Blockburgerforbids the second prosecution, as there is no bilateral uniqueness. 
6 The State only supports its arguments with interpretations of this rule from Illinois, 
Texas, New York, and Indiana. (See Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) Under the rule of stare decisis, 
however, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision on point is controlling and the question 
should be deemed settled. Scott v. Gossett, 66 Idaho 329, 335 (1945); see Houghland 
Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 78 (1990) (noting potential exceptions for 
extreme circumstances). In Idaho, courts focus on the elements of the statutes in 
question to determine if double jeopardy apples. McCormick, 110 Idaho at 114; Sterley, 
112 Idaho at 1099; see also Brown, 432 U.S. at 169. 
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01 (applying the rule from McCormick); State v. Randles, 115 Idaho 611 (Ct. App. 
1989)7 (applying the Blockburger test by examining "the statutory elements" of 
manufacturing a controlled substance and delivery of a controlled substance, finding 
bilateral uniqueness. Id. at 615 (emphasis added)). 
In this case, the two statutes in question are I.C. § 18-923(1) (attempted 
strangulation) and I.C. § 18-918(3)(b) (misdemeanor domestic battery). As fully 
explained in the Appellant's Brief (incorporated herein by reference thereto), the two 
statutes lack the necessary bilateral uniqueness to survive a proper analysis under 
Blockburger and McCormick. (See App. Br., pp.11-16.) As the State admitted in the 
Respondent's Brief that "attempting to strangle a person may encompass a battery ... " 
(Resp. Br., p.9), there is no need to reiterate that argument herein. The State has 
conceded the point - there is no bilateral uniqueness between attempted strangulation 
and misdemeanor domestic battery, particularly as they were applied in this case, and 
therefore, the second prosecution in this case (for attempted strangulation) violated 
Mr. Moffat's state and federal constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy. 
7 The subsequent history from the Court of Appeals' decision in Randles is somewhat 
convoluted. The Idaho Supreme Court subsequently affirmed in part and reversed in 
part the Court of Appeals' decision in Randles, 115 Idaho 611; it did not, however, reach 
the question of double jeopardy or multiple punishments. Randles, 117 Idaho 334, 346 
(1990). However, the Idaho Supreme Court subsequently overruled its decision in 
Randles, 117 Idaho 334, which had been premised on State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 129 
(1979) (specifically speaking to the proper jury instructions to be given when a case was 
premised on only circumstantial evidence). State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 
661-62. However, the only analysis relevant to the issues now on appeal is the analysis 
from Court of Appeals' decision in Randles regarding whether there was a violation of 
the prohibition against multiple punishments for the same course of conduct, analysis 
which was not reversed by the Idaho Supreme Court and which was not disturbed by 
the Humphreys decision. The relevant analysis will be referred to hereinafter as 
"Randles." 
12 
As such, the only question remaining is whether Mr. Moffat's actions were 
sufficiently separate from one another so as to make them separate events or courses 
of conduct. Compare Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301 (holding that, because the sales of 
controlled substances were made at different times (though one immediately after the 
other) for different payments, based on different impetuses to make a deal, the 
composite acts were separate events) McCormick, 110 Idaho at 114-15 (holding that, 
because the required acts for each of the offenses charged were not the same 
(breaking and entering with the necessary intent, as opposed to an act of sexual 
intercourse under certain circumstances), the acts constituted different, separate 
events); Sterley, 112 Idaho 1097 (holding that, because the conspiracy charge 
encompassed the delivery aspect of a narcotics transaction, even though the composite 
acts of the conspiracy occurred at different times than those underlying delivery, they 
were part of a single course of conduct and could not be charged separately). Simply 
put, "the [Idaho] Supreme Court also has held that a general transaction or series of 
events may be treated as several separate acts if the acts are distinguishable." 
Randles, 115 Idaho at 615 (emphasis added) (citing McCormick, 100 Idaho 111). Yet, 
the Randles Court noted that "the question is a close one" when asked to consider 
whether dual prosecutions for manufacturing and possession with intent to deliver were 
part of a single course of conduct when the defendant was growing marijuana, 
harvesting it, and storing it because "there was no single point in time when all 
cultivation and harvesting stopped, and all stockpiling of processed marijuana began." 
Id. at 616. The Court determined that the tipping mechanism was based on the point in 
13 
time each act occurred and the amount of overlap between the composite acts. Id. at 
615-16. 
That is consistent with the test, at least for the by-gone I.C. § 18-301 (which 
codified the prohibition against multiple punishments for the same action, but which was 
repealed in 1995), which was temporal, requiring the first act to be complete before the 
second act began. Randles, 115 Idaho at 615. Here, as the officer, the victim, and an 
independent witness testified, the acts were occurring at the same time. Because the 
separate charging documents cover events which are substantially overlapped, 
occurring at one temporal moment, they cannot appropriately be separated into their 
isolated acts and survive the protections against double jeopardy. See, e.g., 
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301-03; Randles, 115 Idaho at 615-16. Thus, under a 
temporal analysis, they cannot be separated into individual acts, and therefore, the dual 
prosecutions violate the constitutional protections against double jeopardy. 
In this case, as discussed in Section (B) supra, the series of events in this case is 
not distinguishable - the composite acts overlap to the point that they are not temporally 
separated. See, e.g., (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 1 , p.23, L.11 - p.25, L.9; PSI, p.2; Prelim. 
Tr., p.12.) Mr. Moffat's acts were simultaneous, occurring at the same time pursuant to 
a single impulse.8 (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 1 , p.23, L.11 - p.25, L.9.) As such, Mr. Moffat's 
actions constituted a "continuous 'act'" and cannot be subjected to multiple 
punishments. See, e.g., Gallatin, 106 Idaho at 569. Therefore, as Mr. Moffat's 
composite actions from May 9, 2010, cannot be distinguished from one another, they 
8 Where the acts are committed pursuant to the same impulse and at the same time, 
they are part of a continuous act, and thus, cannot be prosecuted separately. 
Blo ckb urger, 284 U.S. at 301-03. 
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are but a single course of conduct, and the second prosecution for that course of 
conduct (attempted strangulation) is unconstitutional. See Randles, 115 Idaho at 
615-16; Sterley, 112 Idaho 1097; see also Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301; McCormick, 
110 Idaho at 114-15. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons articulated above, Mr. Moffat respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss and vacate his conviction for 
attempted strangulation. 
DATED this 2ih day of September, 2012. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
15 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2th day of September, 2012, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be 
placed a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
THOMAS DAVID MOFFAT 
206 WAYNE 
POCATELLO 10 83201 
ROBERT C NAFTZ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, 10 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
Administrative Assistant 
BRO/eas 
16 
